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 Fear and Panic
Why and how are fear and moral competence connected? Let us start by looking 
at the nature of fear and its extension – panic. Fear is a mixed blessing. On the one 
hand, fearful reactions can save us when we encounter a threat, especially when a quick 
reaction is required. But it can also harm or even kill us when it prevents us from fully 
understanding the threat and leads us to make the wrong decisions.  If fear is so strong 
that it prevents us even from reflecting on, and learning from, our decisions, then we are 
dealing with panic. 
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Abstract: Often we have to decide on difficult problems and conflicts. For this, a certain 
level of moral competence is needed, in order to solve them as quickly and adequately as 
possible. Otherwise these problems and conflicts can overwhelm us, triggering a feeling 
of fear and panic, and making us react too slowly or inadequately, or both. Fear and panic 
can make us ignore problems and conflicts, attempt to “solve” them through brute force or 
deceit, or declare them to be beyond our responsibility and let an authority decide what 
to do. Often such makeshift solutions seem to work, but, more often, they have damaging 
effects. Therefore, society tries to curb criminal and anti-democratic activities through 
coercion, that is, through laws, law-enforcing institutions, and correction facilities – at high 
costs, and often with little efficacy. 
In this article I show that such coercion would not be needed if we gave all citizens an 
opportunity to develop their ability to solve conflicts and problems through thinking 
and discus-sion. Moral competence would immunize us against fear and panic, and thus 
also against immoral practices. Moral competence is not inborn in us, and it does not 
develop unless it is fostered through proper learning opportunities. Therefore, if we want 
to live together peace¬fully in a democratic society, we need to provide proper learning 
opportunities for everyone, not only of a few people. If the masses are infected by panic, a 
few rational people cannot stop this pandemic. 
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What happens in our brain when we feel fear? When we encounter a threat, a snake 
for example, our body is immediately activated in order either to fight the threat or to flee 
from it. Both reactions may save us from being killed by the snake. But both can also make 
things worse for us. If we decide to fight, the snake might bite us. If we decide to flee, we may 
fall into an abyss and break our neck. 
LeDoux (1994) has studied what happens in our brains when we see, hear, or smell a 
threat, and when this triggers fear in us. When the information from our senses is recognized 
by the brain areas for seeing, hearing and smelling, they send a signal to our limbic system in 
the lower part of the brain. This area comprises the amygdale, the seat of our emotions, the 
thalamus, which relays information to the other parts of the brain, the hypothalamus and 
the hippocampus, the locations of homeostasis and of memory consolidation, respectively. 
The hippocampus seems to store our encounters with threats. That is, our brain recognizes 
situations as threats only when we have stored respective threatening experiences (e.g., 
with snakes) or have stored warnings from trusted authorities (parents, teachers, media, 
govern ment, etc.) or peers. As parents, often we have to warn our children to stay away from 
harmful things like a hot oven because they would touch it fearlessly and burn themselves. 
Fear is more often learned from other people than from experience, though the latter may 
be more lasting. 
Fear is triggered not only by immediate dangers like wild animals, thieves or explosions 
but also when we encounter challenging tasks at school, at the workplace, in the political 
domain, or when our health is at stake. In those instances, we have to answer difficult moral 
questions. To which alternative should we give priority? Should we try to solve the task in 
a math test or should we just guess, or should we copy the answer from others? Should 
we tell a patient that we do not know how to help him or should be prescribe some pills 
to please him? Should we elect the candidate who would improve my life conditions or 
the candidate who is best for the country? To give a more current example: Should we get 
vaccinated against a certain virus, or should we distrust the safety and effectiveness of the 
vaccination? Like other questions, this decision also triggers difficult moral questions that 
may overburden our ability to solve dilemmas (see Figure 1 below) and thus create fear in 
us, or even panic (this example is taken from Engelbrecht & Köhnlein 2020). 
Figure 1: What can make a decision so difficult (examples for such decisions are found in the article by 
Engelbrecht and Köhnleim (2020).
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Panic Is Shared Fear
If several people, a whole community or a whole nation feel the same kind of fear 
– like fear of a common foe or fear of a virus pandemic – we can refer to this as panic. In 
general, we feel panic less intensively than fear, because when everybody shares the same 
fear, it feels more normal and acceptable. At the same time, it may have a stronger impact 
on our behavior and on society, because we assure each other that the cause for the panic 
still persists, even long after it has gone. Panic cripples our thinking and discussion more 
than individual fear, because there is hardly anyone left who may stimulate our thinking 
and start a discussion. Panic tends to become chronic because we reinforce each other’s 
fears, and also because, after a while, the brain shrinks parts of the frontal lobe when they 
are not used for a longer time, just as the muscles of our legs shrink when we do not use 
them. Even if we want to think again, we cannot think as well as before, because our brain 
lacks the necessary “hardware,” that is, dendrites and synapses. Because we tend to see 
our panic as normal, it hardly ever shows up in surveys. However, it can be observed in 
our behavior. There are some sure signs of a pathological state of panic: When we suffer 
from panic, we tend to avoid thinking and talking about our object of fear at all. If someone 
happens to mention it, we tend to end any conversation or change the topic. Blinded by 
our panic, we think that these people are sick, crazy, or prejudiced against the truth, 
and had better shut up or be locked up so that they cannot bother us anymore. If we are 
arguing, our arguments lack any logic. Panic makes us contradict ourselves. A newspaper 
wrote about the coronavirus: “The infection rate is still rising. But the death rate remains 
very low. This is because people do not get sick.” Sure, if nobody gets sick, the death rate 
is unlikely to increase. But why do people not get sick if the virus is so deadly? Is it not so 
dangerous after all? But if the answer is yes, we would not need to panic anymore! Does 
this thought let us bias our logic? Panic, it seems, wants to keep itself alive by allowing us 
an illogic which under normal conditions we would never accept. 
When in a panic, we use anecdotes and examples for defending our truth, rather 
than scienti fically based numbers, tables and graphs. When a close friend has become 
sick with a certain virus, we are sure that this is proof enough of the existence of a 
pandemic. Even if there are many statistics which show that the virus is not a “killer” but 
a normal flu, our panic leads us to believe more in single cases than in the statistics. When 
in a panic, we also tend to discard other, potentially greater dangers for our health, like 
polluted air and water, or false medication. This is because our brainstem can only handle 
singles causes and does not allow our frontal lobe to bother us with alternative causes as 
explanations for a threat. 
The same is true for the means which we consider for fighting the threat. Again, 
when panic blocks our ability to think, our options are confined to only one means. To 
use our example, we are happy that our government tells us that there is only one way to 
protect us from the virus, namely through vaccination, in spite of the fact that many experts 
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believe that the search for a vaccine must fail, and that our immune system (the “T-cells”) 
can protect us more effectively1. When we are in a panic, we cannot weigh the arguments 
for and against vaccination because this would overburden our thinking ability. Hence, 
we choose the sources of information which we trust more. In normal times this would be 
science. But in a state of panic, we tend to trust the more powerful source. 
This shift of focus from the message to the messenger is typical for panic behavior. In 
a state of panic we can ignore discomforting information. But we cannot ignore the people 
who confront us with it. We think of them as enemies who do not deserve respect and 
civil conver sation, but defamation (“ill-minded liars,” “misled dumb-heads,” “conspiracy 
theorists”)2. 
As Gustave Le Bon (1897) showed 120 years ago in his seminal book The Psychology 
of Masses, panic is often used for political repression. Politicians are tempted to use our 
panic for their purposes because panic paralyzes not only our thinking but also our 
willingness to ask questions and fight for our rights. We let them restrict our civil rights, 
e.g., our rights of free speech and of free movement, because when we are in a state of 
panic, we find it hard to make use of our freedom. We should remember that these threats 
do not have to exist in order to cause panic, but need only be communicated by sources 
that we trust, like our favorite newspaper, TV program, or politician. 
Besides politicians, other actors, like the media and businesses, might also be 
tempted to ex ploit our panic. When we perceive a danger, we buy more newspapers 
and watch more TV. In times of international tensions, we expect our government to 
order more weapons and security devices. When we are afraid of a virus pandemic, we 
demand distancing rules, face masks, mass testing and mass vaccination. In that case, the 
beneficiaries are many: manufacturers and distributors of masks, medicines, tests and 
vaccines, and their shareholders. What reasons should these actors have to declare the 
end of the panic when the statistics show that there was only a common flu and that this 
has already ended? These actors may even be tempted to keep our panic alive with (fake) 
information about an allegedly ongoing pandemic, like we did to the girls when we were 
young: “Watch out, the spider is still on your back.”
Eventually panic feeders may find themselves caught in a vicious circle, namely 
when they cannot stop the panic-pandemic anymore, even when its costs have become 
unbearably high. Now citizens might believe so deeply in the existence of a pandemic that 
they demand the lockdown be continued. This explains why panic can persist even when 
the damage done by the panic far exceeds the damage caused by the original danger. 
Sometimes, a panic will end in a fatal disaster (LeBon 1897).
1  For extensive information and scientific articles on this issue see the CHD’s website: https://
childrenshealthdefense.org/. 
2  For example, Dr. Wolfgang Wodarg, who has decades of experience and competence as a 
physician, epidemiologist and health politician, believes that the current corona “pandemic” is 
just an ordinary flu. For this belief, which is supported by many scientific studies, he is vilified in 
television programs and was thrown out of an association of which he was a member of the board. 
His videos on the internet were blocked several times. 
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Fostering People’s Moral Competence Can Prevent Panic 
Yet there is hope, at least for the future. Studies show that not all of us become 
panic-stricken and behave irrationally when we are faced with a (real or a communicated) 
threat. Many of us are able to weigh alternatives and to discuss controversial matters with 
others, and to make our decisions on the basis of our moral principles. For these people, 
difficult problems and conflicts are no threat and do not cause them to panic. When we 
understand why they can handle problems and conflicts under pressure and do not show 
signs of panic, we may be able to say how we can help the others to achieve the same. 
The key to this understanding is moral competence, the technical term for our 
ability to solve problems and conflicts, which involve moral principles, through thinking 
and discussion (Lind 2019a). Favorable learning opportunities are necessary to develop 
this competence (Schillinger 2016). Because people differ greatly with regard to the 
number and quality of such opportunities, they also differ widely with regard to their 
moral competence. If we had too few such opportunities, it is very likely that we will fail 
to solve problems and conflicts through thinking and discourse, and that we will have to 
use means which we consider immoral ourselves: ignorance, violence, deceit and blind 
obedience to an authority. The importance of moral competence may become clear when 
we look closely at some classical psychological experiments.
Stanley Milgram (1974) showed in his famous experiment that obedience to 
an authority can paralyze our moral conscience. The experimenter, who assumes the 
authority of a psychological researcher, instructs participants to give learners electric 
shocks when they made an error in a learning task. The shocks and the reactions of the 
victims are fake, but the participants are not aware of this. The findings show that most 
obey the instructions, although they cannot see the great pain that they cause. Milgram 
concluded from this finding that human behavior is fully under the control of external 
authorities, and that inner instances like a moral conscience cannot influence people’s 
behavior.
Erich Fromm contradicted this interpretation. For him, Milgram’s study actually 
shows the “presence of conscience in most subjects, and their pain when obedience made 
them act against their conscience” (Fromm 1973, 75). His interpretation is supported by 
the reports which the participants gave after the experiment was finished, and by fact that 
some stopped torturing the learners prematurely. 
But why did they stop, and why not the others? What enabled them to do so? 
Milgram in advertently gives us a hint. He reports that participants with a higher level 
of education were more disobedient that those with a lower level (Milgram 1974, 234). 
Do resisters possess an ability which has been stimulated through their education? The 
answer seems to be yes, as Kohlberg (1984) has shown in an experiment similar to 




Kohlberg created a clinical interview method for measuring moral competence. 
This scale is known as the Moral Stages. On the basis of my new understanding of moral 
competence and following a critical analysis of the clinical interview method (Lind 1989), 
I have developed an objective method of making moral competence visible in the pattern 
of people’s responses to an experi mentally designed test, the Moral Competence Test (see 
Lind 1978; 1981; 2019a). In terms of showing the power of moral competence in people’s 
behavior, we can consider both methods as equally valid.
In his experiment, Kohlberg found that obedience to authority was indeed strongly 
correlated with moral competence. Of the participants with a high moral competence 
(Stage 5 “principled morality”), 75% resisted authority, compared to 13% in the group 
of lower moral competence (Kohlberg 1984). This finding suggests that if our moral 
competence is sufficiently developed, we can solve difficult problems and conflicts 
without the need to panic.
Franz-Josef Mansbart (2001) has shown that in fact participants with low moral 
competence scores need considerably more time for solving dilemmas than high scorers 
(r = -.36; my calculation, see Lind 2002). 
Kristin Prehn and her colleagues were even able to find the main location of these 
processes, namely in the right dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). We may call it the 
seat of moral competence. Whereas all the parts of our nervous system are more or less 
involved when we are confronted with a moral dilemma, the DLPFC is the busiest part of 
our brain. The correlation between the amount of activity (measured by the BOLD level) in 
that area and the C-score of the Moral Competence Test, was unusually high; r = -0,47. As in 
Mansbart’s experiment, the participants with low moral competence needed much longer 
for deciding behavioral dilemmas than the participants with a high moral competence. Li 
et al. (2016), who ran a similar series of experiments, corroborated Prehn’s finding.
More support for our hypothesis comes from studies of conformity behavior. 
Solomon Asch (1955) showed that most of us are ready to let others think for us. He 
showed that we often trust our own thinking less than the thinking of other people if they 
are more numerous. Psy chologists call this phenomenon conformism. In his experiment, 
Asch asked the participants which of three lines on a sheet of paper had the same length 
as the line on another piece of paper. When the other participants, who had been prepared 
by the experimenter, gave the same wrong answer, most of the participants changed their 
correct answer in order to agree with the majority. Obviously, they trusted the opinion 
of the majority more than their own thinking. But, like Milgram, Asch forgot to ask why 
some of them resisted the temptation of conformity? Aida Mofakhami (2019) repeated 
Asch’s experiment online, but also measures her participants’ moral competence. Indeed, 
participants with high moral competence were less prone to the conformity effect. Her 
effect was weak, maybe because the social conformity pressure was mitigated by the 
online medium and, therefore, not as strong as in Asch’s expe riment with real groups of 
participants. 
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Sharon McNamee (1977) found that participants with low levels of moral 
competence were less likely to help people in distress. However, these participants 
were not less willing to help but, as they reported afterwards, they felt paralyzed by the 
conflicting thoughts and feelings that the helping situation had elicited in them.
The importance of moral competence for solving problems is also shown in the 
study by Beke Lenz (2006) on youths’ drug consumption. She found that adolescents who 
faced severe life problems (e.g., losing a friend, getting of bad grades in school, suffering 
from their parent’s divorce) tend to use drugs to calm down their feelings – but only 
when they had a low moral competence. These youths were not able to cope with their 
problems through thinking or through consulting with their parents, friends or teachers. 
Therefore, they had to fight the emotions which these conflicts caused through alcohol, 
smoking or other drugs. In contrast, participants with higher moral competence were 
apparently able to cope with their problems and, therefore, did not need to use drugs in 
order to calm their emotions. 
These and many other experimental studies suggest (a) that moral competence 
really is a very important determinant of our behavior, and (b) that there seems to be 
a certain level of com petence which must be attained if we want to solve our problems 
and conflicts success fully through thinking and thus avoid panic (Lind 2019a; 2019b). 
In terms of measurement, this critical level is marked by a C-score of 20.0 in the Moral 
Competence Test (see Figure 2). I should mention that this C-score is not a clear cut-off 
score but a statistical signpost. It should not be applied to individuals but only to groups 
of people. 
If we are unable to develop this level of moral competence, we mostly feel 
overburdened by living in a free, democratic society. We feel permanent stress and easily 
panic when something unusual (like a virus pandemic) happens. In order to reduce this 
stress-feeling we try to “solve” problems and conflict in everyday life by ignoring them, or, 
if we cannot ignore them, by using violence and deceit, or, if this does not work, by letting 
authorities think for us and solve our problems.
Figure 2: The critical level for moral competence to become relevant for behavior.
When citizens lack even a minimum amount of moral competence, society must 
spend a big share of its budget for law-making, law-enforcement, judicial decision-
making, correction facilities, making reparations to victims and fixing the damage caused 
by criminal behavior. Just imagine that a small misdemeanor like traveling by bus without 
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a ticket can result in a prison sen tence of several months. Such a small damage of a few 
dollars can cost society several thousand dollars, in terms of punishing the transgressors. 
I believe that this money could be better spent on fostering their moral competence. So if 
we want to maintain and to improve our democracy, we must, above all, foster the moral 
competence of all citizens. This can neither be achieved by classical education nor by 
conventional civic education, as J. Westheimer rightly argues:
In study after study, we come to similar conclusions: the kinds of goals and 
practices commonly represented in curricula that hope to foster democratic 
citizenship usually have more to do with voluntarism, charity, and obedience 
than with democracy. In other words, good citizenship to many educators means 
listening to authority figures, dressing neatly, being nice to neighbors, and helping 
out at a soup kitchen - not grappling with the kinds of social policy decisions that 
every citizen in a democratic society needs to learn how to do (Westheimer 2015, 
472). 
If they want to serve our democracy well, our schools have to foster our children’s 
ability to think for themselves, to trust their own thinking, and to discuss controversial 
issues with opponents. That is, in order to lift the overall level of moral competence in our 
societies to the needed minimum level, its schools have to provide their students with 
sufficient opportunities for using and training their moral competence, and to participate 
in exchanges with others (Figure 3).
Figure 3: The current level of moral competence in most societies (solid line) is too low for living together 
peacefully in a democracy. We must it above the threshold (dotted line).
 This implies a big shift in teaching methods. Students’ thinking and discussions 
must not be guarded and graded by an authority (the teacher) but must follow moral-
democratic principles. Actually, it must follow only one basic principle, namely the free 
speech-principle: everyone is allowed to say anything he or she wants, but must never 
qualify (praise or blame) any other participant. Having over twenty years of experience 
of working with this simple principle, I feel entitled to say: It works! Never has any 
participant transgressed. All I needed to do was to announce this principle and “threaten” 
to remind anyone who would break it. I never had to remind anyone. 
 This principle is the center piece of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion® 
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(KMDD), which I have developed on the basis of Blatt and Kohlberg’s (1975) method of 
dilemma dis cussion (Lind 2019a; Reinicke 2017). The KMDD has been tested and evaluated 
many times (Lind 2019a). The KMDD is a very effective and yet not very complex method 
for the promotion of moral competence. However, the KMDD’s effectiveness depends on 
the quality of the training of the teachers who use it. Hopefully, institutions of higher 
education will begin to offer such training. I would gladly assist. 
Conclusions
In this article I have shown that we do not need to coerce people into democracy, 
which is rather paradoxical, if we foster everyone’s ability to solve the conflicts and 
problems, which democracy inevitably confronts us with, through thinking and discussion. 
This moral compe tence would immunize people against fear of freedom and against 
panic, and thus also against immoral practices. Moral competence is not inborn and 
does not develop unless it is fostered through proper learning opportunities (Lind 2000, 
2020; Schillinger 2006). Therefore, if we want to live together peacefully in a democratic 
society, all people must be provided with sufficient opportunities for using their moral 
competence. This is the most honorable task of schools in a democracy.
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